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WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
instant case) and made in ignorance of a case of measles contracted
by the child subsequent to his last hospitalization.
It seems apparent that, while the Business Records Act has waived
the necessity for cross examination concerning certain hearsay records,
under the rule of the Young case opinions contained in the record must
meet the same standards as oral testimony.
DOUGLAS M. FRYER
LABOR RELATIONS
Federal Pre-Emption under Taft-Hartley-Interference with
Employment as an Unfair Labor Practice as well as a Common
Law Tort. In Selles v. Local 1431 the plaintiff had been a member
of the defendant union in which there was, early in 1952, some internal
strife. Selles was one of several members of the union who organized
a meeting of those dissatisfied with union policies concerning election
of officers and dissemination of information about union funds. Some
150 members who were not sympathetic to Selles marched en masse
into the meeting hall and broke up the meeting.
Within a few days following, Selles went to the union's hiring hall
to get a job assignment and was told there was no work for him. It
was determined as an ultimate fact that this was done in retaliation
for Selles' activities in organizing the grievance meeting. Selles was
not regularly employed for more than a year thereafter, and was
finally compelled to find less remunerative nonteamster work.
Selles filed a complaint with the National Labor Relations Board.
After they took jurisdiction, he withdrew the complaint and brought
suit in superior court on a common law tort theory-interference with
employment-and recovered damages measured by his loss of earnings.
On appeal the union maintained that its alleged misconduct con-
stituted an unfair labor practice under the Labor Management Rela-
tions Act' and that, by this act, Congress had preempted the field.
The court, while agreeing that the union's conduct amounted to an
unfair labor practice under this section of the LMRA, nevertheless2
150 Wn2d 660, 314 P.2d 456 (1957).
2 61 STAT. 140 (1947) 29 U.S.C.A. § 157 (1956). "Employees shall have the right
to self-organization, to form, join or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively
through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activi-
ties for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, and
shall also have the right to refrain from any or all of such activities except to the
extent that such right may be affected by an agreement requiring membership in a labor
organization as a condition of employment as authorized in 158 (a) (3)."
61 STAT. 140 (1947), 29 U.S.C.A. § 158 (b) (1) (A) (1956). "It shall be an unfair
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held that the state courts retained jurisdiction. In so deciding the
court followed United Construction Workers v. Laburnum Construc-
tion Corp.,' holding that a state is not precluded from affording com-
mon law tort remedies which are not available under the LMRA.
The Washington court grounded its decision on the theory that while
under certain circumstances the NLRB could grant reinstatement to
employment with back pay, it had available no remedy measured by
back pay for a union member who did not seek reinstatement to his
job with back pay, but who accepted his disassociation from the job
as a fait accompli, and pursued only a common law tort remedy.
In so deciding, the court chose between two recent but earlier
Washington cases which were seemingly inconsistent on the question
of state court jurisdiction as opposed to federal preemption in cases
of union interference with an employee's job.4 These were the cases
of Mahoney v. Sailors' Union of the Pacific5 and Baun v. Lumber and
Sawmill Workers' Union.'
In the Mahoney case the plaintiff was a sailor whose employment
depended upon his holding a valid "shipping card." The hiring pro-
cedure when a job was open consisted of examining the cards of the
available sailors, and giving the job to that man whose card bore the
earliest date. At a Seattle union meeting Mahoney made insulting
remarks aimed at the union management, for which charges were
brought against him through internal union procedures set out in the
union's constitution and by-laws. A union trial was held in San Fran-
cisco, at which Mahoney was not present, and it was decided that he
should be expelled.
Meanwhile, the Seattle office, not immediately adopting the expul-
labor practice for a labor organization or its agents to restrain or coerce employees in
the exercise of rights guaranteed in Sec. 157; Provided, That this paragraph shall not
impair the right of a labor organization to prescribe its own rules with respect to the
acquisition or retention of membership therein;"...
61 STAT. 140 (1947), 29 U.S.C.A. § 158 (b) (2) (1956). "It shall be an unfair labor
practice for a labor organization or its agents to cause or attempt to cause an employer
to discriminate against an employee in violation of subsection (a) (3) of this section
or to discriminate against an employee with respect to whom membership in such
organization has been denied or terminated on some ground other than his failure to
tender the periodic dues and the initiation fees uniformly required as a condition of
acquiring or retaining membership ;"
61 STAT. 140 (1947), 29 U.S.C.A. § 158 (a) (3) (1956). "It shall be an unfair labor
practice for an employer by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment
to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization." [Proviso]
3 347 U.S. 656 (1954).
4 The line of federal supreme court decisions bearing upon the extent to which the
LMRA has pre-empted the field to the exclusion of state court jurisdiction appears in
30 VASH. L. Rxv. 1 and 31 WAsH. L. REv. 39.
r 45 Wn.2d 453, 275 P.2d 440 (1954).
6 46 Wn.2d 645, 284 P.2d 275 (1955).
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sion order, issued Mahoney a new shipping card. But by the time
Mahoney's card was old enough to qualify him for a job the Seattle
office declined to assign him. Mahoney, thus deprived of his liveli-
hood, brought suit in equity in superior court, seeking reinstatement
to the union, damages measured by his loss of back pay, and protec-
tion of his property rights in union funds, i.e. burial and health and
welfare benefits. The trial court found for Mahoney on the grounds
that (a) his conduct was not in violation of the union's rules, (b) the
union violated its own rules by holding the hearing in a remote place,
and (c) expulsion from the union deprived Mahoney of a property
right without due process.
At the second hearing of the case before the supreme court the union
argued, as in the Selles case, that its alleged misconduct amounted to
an unfair labor practice under the LMRAJ and that this being so, the
state court lacked jurisdiction. On the grounds that the LMRA pro-
vided a procedure under which the union could be required to cease
discriminating against Mahoney and to give him back pay,8 the court
held that Mahoney's recovery in Washington state courts for the
union's tortious conduct should be limited to protecting the property
rights Mahoney had in the union funds. The court accomplished this
by ordering Mahoney's reinstatement in the union, but at the same
time specifically denying that it had power to order such reinstate-
ment "in so far as such order was intended as a means of forcing the
union to cease such unfair labor practice. '
In the Baun case'" the jurisdiction question could have been settled
without reference to federal preemption. Here the plaintiff seeking
damages for the union's tortious interference with his employment as
a sawmill superintendent. The union again argued federal preemption
under the LMRA,"1 but this argument was rejected on the grounds
that there was no unfair labor practice involved since, among other
reasons, a sawmill superintendent, is not an "employee" under the
meaning attached to that word by the act. This being so, there was
no federal remedy available whatever, so the state could take juris-
diction. However, the opinion added:
Further, we put our conclusion that Washington courts have jurisdic-
tion of the subject matter of this litigation on the still broader base that
7 See footnote 2, supra.
8 29 U.S.C.A. § 160 (c) (e) (1956).
9 45 Wn.2d at 461, 275 P.2d at 448.
10 46 Wn.2d 645, 284 P.2d 275 (1955).
11 See footnote 2, supra.
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the traditional jurisdiction of a state court to enforce a common law
tort liability has not been removed, at least in such a case as the present,
by the labor management relations act, even though the tortious con-
duct constitutes an unfair labor practice . 2 (Emphasis court's.)
The opinion then lists the elements present in the Baun case which
would take the case out of the rule of Mahoney, a case which, remark-
ably, is not mentioned in the Baun opinion. These are:
1. The plaintiff was not seeking to enjoin or restrain activities of
either the union or the company.
2. He was not seeking reinstatement in his position.
3. He was not seeking back pay.
4. He merely sought damages for unlawful interference with his
employment, a remedy which the NLRB cannot provide and which
"does not involve any question of present or future relations between
the company and himself, or the company and its other employees."' 3
The Selles case, then, appears to fit squarely under the alternative
holding in the Baun case, and, since it does not expressly overrule
Mahoney, leaves the status of the rule in Washington substantially
as follows: whether or not an employee can recover damages measured
by back pay from a union which has interfered with his employment
by conduct which also amounts to an unfair labor practice under the
LMRA will depend on (a) what he seeks besides back pay, and
(b) how he asks for what he wants.
If the plaintiff wants to recover back pay from the union on the
common law tort theory of interference with employment, he can do
so under the theory of Baun and Selles even though the union's con-
duct constitutes an unfair labor practice under the LMRA, but only
if he limits his prayer for relief to that remedy which has traditionally
been available for common law torts, that is, damages for harm already
done him. If he so couches his pleadings, Baun and Selles indicate that
recovery of damages measured by back pay would be available in
Washington courts.
On the other hand, the Mahoney case says that recovery of back
pay can be had only through the NLRB if the plaintiff union member
seeks back pay on broad pleadings that contemplate the prevention
of continuing or future unfair labor practices by the defendant union.
This distinction, based as it is on the interest of the Congress in pre-
venting unfair labor practices, as opposed to the traditional state
1246 Wn.2d at 651, 652, 284 P.2d at 280.
13 46 Wn.2d at 652, 284 P.2d at 280.
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interest of requiring tortfeasors to make the injured whole, is logically
supportable, though it seems to give an unusual importance to plead-
ing niceties.
In 1957 the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari 4 in
Gonzales v. International Association of Machinists,5 a California
case factually similar to Mahoney. In that case the expelled union
member sought reinstatement to the union, and damages for loss of
wages and mental distress on a breach of contract theory. The
California court granted all relief sought, basing its award of damages
measured by back pay on the ground that it was "not for an unfair
labor practice, but for breach of contract and as incidental to the
restoration to plaintiff of his right of membership."'" If this decision
is affirmed by the Supreme Court, new doubt would be cast on the
efficacy of Mahoney. FRED BRUHN
LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW
Local Government Law-Declaratory Judgment-Municipal Corporations. P, a
Pasco taxpayer, brought an action for declaratory judgment and injunction, claiming
the city of Pasco could not lease municipally owned land for a parking lot. D city
relied upon the following: RCW 35.24.010: "Every city of the third class... may
control and dispose of [property] for the common benefit...." ; RCW 35.24.300: "The
city council ... shall have power to... control, lease, sublease, convey or otherwise
dispose of [property] ... ;; to lease any waterfront and other lands adjacent thereto
owned by it...; to lease... portions of its streets which bound upon or terminate in
its waterfront....; and Laws 1955, c. 294: "The city council of the city of Pasco...
shall have power to lease, sell, or otherwise dispose [of the land in question]...."
Held, (6-3) for P taxpayer. Miller v. Pasco, 50 Wn.2d 229, 310 P.2d 863 (1957).
The court's reasoning and conclusions were as follows:
(1) P was a proper party plaintiff under the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act,
RCW 7.24, because he was a taxpayer "and otherwise meets the qualifications of an
interested person, as defined by RCW 7.24.020." If this means taxpayers are proper
parties plaintiff to bring declaratory judgment actions to contest the legality of acts of
municipal officers, then the decision is of first impression on this point in Washington.
(See 87 A.L.R. 1243; 114 A.L.R. 1366.)
(2) RCW 3524.010 does not give power ot lease, because "may control" does not
give power to delegate control, and "dispose of" means to sell. RCW 35.24.300 does
not give power to lease anything except waterfront lands, because specific provisions
control the general grant of power to lease.
(3) Laws 1955, c. 294, is unconstitutional. Washington Const. art. 2, § 28, prohibits
special laws granting corporate powers. This applies to municipal corporations.
14352 U.S. 966 (1957).
15142 Cal. App.2d 207, 298 P.2d 92 (1956).
16 298 P.2d at 99.
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